Lenovo: Being on Top in a Declining Industry by Zwanenburg, Sander Paul & Farhoomand, Ali
Communications of the Association for Information Systems
Volume 42 Article 17
4-2018
Lenovo: Being on Top in a Declining Industry
Sander Paul Zwanenburg
University of Otago, info@sanderpaul.com
Ali Farhoomand
The University of Hong Kong
Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/cais
This material is brought to you by the AIS Journals at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted for inclusion in Communications of the
Association for Information Systems by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact
elibrary@aisnet.org.
Recommended Citation
Zwanenburg, Sander Paul and Farhoomand, Ali (2018) "Lenovo: Being on Top in a Declining Industry," Communications of the













 ssociation for nformation ystems 
    
 
Teaching Case DOI: 10.17705/1CAIS.04217 ISSN: 1529-3181 
Volume 42  Paper 17   pp. 455 – 480  April 2018 
 
Lenovo: Being on Top in a Declining Industry 
 
Sander Paul Zwanenburg 
Department of Information Science 
University of Otago, New Zealand 
spzwanenburg@gmail.com 
 Ali Farhoomand 
School of Business 




For the first time since the 2008 financial crisis, Lenovo, the world’s largest PC maker, had not only failed to increase 
its revenues and profits but also a net loss. Lenovo’s market share was still growing, but the PC market itself was 
shrinking by about five percent annually. Lenovo hoped to broaden its leadership toward smaller computing devices, a 
market that had seen more growth. It purchased Motorola Mobility in 2014 and continued to invest in its smartphone 
business through branding and innovation. Yet, in 2016, this business did not make a profit and only grew in some 
geographical markets. Lenovo faced fierce competition from giants such as Apple and Samsung and from Chinese 
manufacturers that had quickly grown in market share. How could Lenovo reignite growth and sustain its position as a 
global industry leader? 
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1 Introduction 
Our overall results were not as strong as we wanted. The difficult market conditions impacted our 
financial performance. 
—Yang Yuanqing, Chairman and CEO of Lenovo (Lenovo, 2016b, p. 9) 
For the first time since the 2008 financial crisis, Lenovo, the world’s largest personal computer (PC) 
maker, had not only failed to increase its revenues and profits but also a net loss. Lenovo’s market share 
was still growing, but the PC market itself was shrinking by about five percent annually (see Appendix A). 
Lenovo had hoped that its US$2.91 billion acquisition of the Motorola Mobility handset business in 2014 
would prove as fruitful as the company’s acquisition of IBM’s personal computing division a decade 
earlier. Such hopes proved to be too optimistic, however, because Lenovo faced strong competition in 
local and international markets. Its position among the smartphone vendors in China dropped from second 
to eleventh between 2014 and 2016, while its worldwide market share shrank from 13 percent to 4.6 
percent. In 2016, its smartphones group had an operational loss of US$469 million (Lenovo, 2016b).  
In response, Lenovo embarked on a two-pronged strategy of consolidating its core PC business while 
broadening its product portfolio. The PC group, which focused on desktops, laptops, and tablets, aimed to 
improve its profitability through market consolidation and product innovation. The smartphones group 
focused on positioning the brand, improving margins, streamlining distribution channels, and expanding 
geographical reach. 
However, the company was unsure about how it could thrive in a declining PC industry. Nor did it know 
how it would compete in a tough smartphones market dominated by the international juggernauts Apple 
and Samsung and strong local players such as Huawei, Oppo, Vivo, and Xiaomi. 
Yang Yuanqing, Lenovo’s chairman and CEO, wondered whether Lenovo’s two-pronged strategy would 
reignite growth and sustain its position as a global technology leader. 
2 Lenovo 
Lenovo was a multibillion-dollar Fortune Global 500 company listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. 
Its 60,000 employees worldwide supported operations in 60 countries and served its customers in over 
160 countries (Lenovo, 2016b). It manufactured a variety of computers from smartphones to servers. It 
had US$45 billion worth of sales in the company’s 2016 fiscal year (see Appendix B for Lenovo’s income 
statements and balance sheets)1. 
Three decades earlier, the company, then called Legend, had started in a small Beijing bungalow. Liu 
Chuanzhi, a computer scientist, and 10 engineers founded the company in 1984 and hoped to run the 
business by developing new technologies. They tried importing televisions and marketing a digital watch. 
But these attempts failed along with other early ones because many of the founders lacked business 
experience and concentrated only on product quality. As Chuanzi (Ling, 2006) said: “We were mainly 
scientists and didn’t understand the market. We just learned by trial-and-error, which was very 
interesting—but also very dangerous.”. 
2.1 Growth 
The initial struggles helped the company learn about the latest computing technology from abroad and the 
consumer market in China (Marshall, 2001). The company experienced its first success in developing 
circuit boards to enable IBM PCs to process Chinese characters (Ling, 2006). The company started to 
grow: after a recruitment advertisement on the front page of the China Youth News in May 1988, it hired 
58 people. In 1990, it began to manufacture and market computers under its own Chinese brand name. 
Only in 2004 did it adopt the name Lenovo (made up of Le from Legend, its previous English company 
name, and novo, Latin for new). 
While the company broadened its product range to workstations, servers, digital entertainment devices, 
and mobile phones, its PC business remained its core focus. It grew rapidly thanks to a quickly expanding 
Chinese PC market. Its share in this market mushroomed from 14 percent in 1998 to 30 percent in 2000 
                                                     
1 Lenovo’s fiscal years end on 31 March. 
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(Marshall, 2001). It raised US$212 million from its second public offering in 2000 to fund its continued 
growth. Lenovo also saw an opportunity to grow internationally and, in 2005, bought IBM’s PC division for 
US$1.25 billion. Afterwards, the company’s turnover almost quadrupled in size (Lenovo, 2006). 
In many ways, this merger came to define Lenovo’s new identity as a global company. It embraced the 
diversity of Eastern and Western cultures to become one of world’s largest technology firms. It focused on 
developing new products while growing both organically and through mergers and acquisitions. 
In the decade after acquiring IBM’s PC division, Lenovo realized steady growth in revenues except for one 
year during the 2007-2008 financial crisis2.  An increase in PC sales and the company’s acquisition of new 
businesses primarily drove the company’s growth. In 2011, it bought NEC, Japan’s largest PC vendor at 
the time, and Medion, a large German consumer electronics company. Two years later, it acquired CCE, a 
large Brazilian consumer electronics company3. These acquisitions helped Lenovo to become a dominant 
player in the PC market worldwide. By 2016, the company had reached record shares of the PC market in 
all geographical areas: 36.5 percent in Greater China, 17.5 percent in the Asia-Pacific (excluding Greater 
China), 13.7 percent in the Americas, and 20.0 percent in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa (Lenovo, 
2016b). See Appendix C for a geographical analysis of Lenovo’s turnover. 
Lenovo’s growth in PCs was unlike its experience in phones. In 2006, its Mobile Handset product group 
accounted for four percent of revenue. Its growth in China was strong initially but weakened later as new 
competitors entered the market. Lenovo sold the business in March, 2008, “to allow the group to better 
focus on its core PC business” (Lenovo, 2008). Not long after, however, Lenovo pivoted when it launched 
its mobile Internet strategy. It hoped to benefit from the new and fast-growing product category by buying 
back its Mobile Business Group in 2009 (Shah, 2010). The new business group started growing steadily, 
especially in China. The company hoped to expand its share of the market in the Americas by acquiring 
Motorola from Google in 2014. As Yang Yuanqing, Chairman and CEO of Lenovo said (Ling, 2006): 
[In fiscal 2015], we shipped a record 76 million units and strengthened our position as the 
world’s #3 smartphone company. The addition of Motorola helped us expand to more than 60 
markets worldwide, making us a truly global smartphone company. And now, almost 60% of 
smartphone volume comes from outside of China, giving us a global footprint that is a true 
competitive advantage. 
Lenovo also invested in computing storage and cloud services. In 2012, it launched a joint venture with 
EMC to take over a computing storage enterprise that EMC had purchased earlier. In the same year, it 
also acquired Stoneware, a provider of cloud-computing services. Two years later, it bought IBM’s x86 
server business. It acquired these companies to serve its objective of providing consumers and 
organizations with computing solutions that included both traditional hardware and Internet-based services 
(Lenovo, 2012). After Lenovo’s reorganization around 2015, it set up its Enterprise Business Group and 
the Ecosystem and Cloud Services Business Group (ECS). While ECS remained tiny (it represented less 
than two percent of Lenovo’s revenue in 2016), its Enterprise Business Group grew from one percent of 
the company’s revenues in 2014 to 10 percent in 2016. 
2.2 Running Lenovo 
Lenovo ran its business from several locations. It was incorporated and headquartered in Hong Kong; its 
key operational centers were located in Beijing, Morrisville in North Carolina, and Singapore. Seven of its 
nine research centers were in China, one was in Japan, and one was in the US, while its sales centers 
were in the US, France, China, and Singapore. With these centers around the world, Lenovo tried to be 
both global and local at the same time so it could embrace differences across markets to capitalize quickly 
on new ideas and opportunities in different locations.  
Its top management team comprised six corporate executives (CxOs) who had mostly begun working at 
the company in the last five years. Others on the team were all executive vice presidents or senior vice 
presidents and led various groups or divisions (see Appendix D). Representing radically different cultures 
and countries, the top management team emphasized the value of diversity and saw it as a strength. The 
company strove to serve different customers with widely diverse needs and desires with a team of “wide-
ranging experiences, multiple skills, and a variety of cultural backgrounds” (Lenovo, 2016a). It hired 
people from all walks of life but with the common aspiration of achieving excellence in delivering 
                                                     
2 The financial crisis peaked in 2008, causing Lenovo to report a decline in profits for fiscal year 2009. 
3 Lenovo sold CCE back to its original owners a few years later. 
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unparalleled products. To this end, the management emphasized teamwork, entrepreneurship, and 
innovation and focused on transforming Lenovo from a device-oriented company to a more customer-
centric company. Yang said (Lenovo, 2016b, p. 11): “We want to make life better and work more efficiently 
by delivering smart end-user devices, powerful infrastructure, all with connected services and apps, and 
the best user experience.”. 
Yang observed that, in the age of the Internet of things, a wide variety of devices could embed computing. 
With the advent of smartphones, tablets, smartwatches, and other mobile computers, the number of 
connected computers people used had begun to increase. Serving those needs required centralizing the 
user, not the device. Yang said (Lenovo, 2016b, p. 11): 
While new ideas for devices will emerge, the device itself will no longer be enough. Customers 
will need a device that is seamlessly connected to the cloud in order to deliver the right solution 
or experience—at home, at work or on the go. 
With this more holistic perspective on the use of connected devices and services, Lenovo saw growth 
opportunities. It had already begun expanding its capabilities in serving customers with the cloud, and it 
had set up its ECS. With these initiatives, Lenovo wanted to make devices that were more seamlessly 
connected because it saw devices no longer as end products but as entry points for experiencing content 
and services. According to Yang (Lenovo, 2016b, p. 42): 
To maximize performance, we will manage different types of businesses differently based on 
the varying stages of maturity as well as synergy with our core business. Based on these 
criteria, each business will have the appropriate set of performance metrics, priorities, 
management processes, ownership structure and incentives. 
Lenovo had aligned its organizational structure to support different categories of businesses.  
• The PC and Smart Device Business Group focused on desktop and laptop PCs, tablets, 
detachables, and gaming devices. It accounted for most of the revenue (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Analysis of Lenovo's Revenue by Group and Fiscal Year in Billions of US 
Dollars (Adapted from Lenovo, 2014; Lenovo, 2015; Lenovo, 2016b) 
• The Mobile Business Group focused on smartphones; one subgroup concentrated on China 
where it had accumulated much experience, and another focused on the rest of the world 
where it saw much potential to grow.  
• The Data Center Group, previously called Enterprise, accounted for 10 percent of Lenovo’s 
revenues in 2016, but the company saw it as key to delivering a valuable product portfolio for 
enterprise customers (Lenovo, 2016b).  
• The Lenovo Capital and Incubator Group did not focus on particular product categories but 
sought to drive innovation. It invested in startups, explored new technologies, and focused on 
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In sum, the PC and mobile business groups were Lenovo’s dominant groups. While it had a common 
philosophy for its products, it also recognized the importance of cultural specificities. Lenovo had specified 
different strategies across products and, depending on geography, even in product groups. 
3 Personal Computers 
In 2016, Lenovo seemed to do relatively well in the extended PC market. It was the world’s largest vendor 
of traditional PCs for the third straight year and one of the largest vendors of tablets. Yang said (Lenovo, 
2016b, p. 8):  
We achieved a record market share of 21% as we continued to win and deliver strong 
profitability in our core PC business. [We also achieved a] record market share in our tablet 
business: We sold almost 11 million units and outgrew the market for the year, strengthening 
our #3 position in the world. 
While outgrowing the market was a source of pride, the growth of the market itself caused concern. For 
several years, the total number of PCs sold worldwide had been declining. This decline came amid 
changing conditions in the industry. 
For instance, diversified form factors changed the marketplace. Desktop computers had long been the 
dominant form of computers, until laptop sales overtook desktop sales in 2008 (Hartley, 2008). In 2010, 
Apple introduced the first successful tablet computer—the iPad—which attracted much attention. Tablets 
filled a gap between smartphones and laptops in terms of portability, screen size, and computing power 
and fitted into many everyday situations. The rapid adoption of tablets caused their sales to overtake that 
of laptops in 2011 (ABI Research, 2011). As tablets rose in popularity, vendors hoped to fill more gaps on 
the same continuum. Some introduced “phablets”, situated between smartphones and tablets 4 , and 
“convertibles”, situated between tablets and laptops. Convertibles, also known as two-in-one devices, 
allowed people to use a physical keyboard as if using a laptop and to use the touchscreen display as if 
using a tablet. 
In the marketplace, this diversification caused quite a stir. Many tablet vendors came and went after Apple 
introduced its first iPad (Statista, 2016b). In 2011, Apple alone owned 60 percent of the tablet market, but 
quickly lost ground to a flurry of new entrants. By 2016, as sales dropped and the market seemed to 
settle, more than half of Apple’s 2011 share ended up with Samsung, Amazon, Lenovo, and Huawei. 
For consumers, the new form factors allowed them to conveniently handle devices without a table or desk. 
Their overlap in computing functionality made them partly substitutes and partly complements. The sharp 
rise of tablets in the US, for example, came with only a slight decline in ownership of desktops or laptops 
(see Figure 2). In comparison to tablets, convertibles resembled laptops more closely and were more 
likely used as a replacement for them. 
 
Figure 2. Worldwide Sales of PCs by Type and Year in Millions of Units (Pew Research Center, 
2015) 
Relying less on a single computer, people waited longer to upgrade their PC. It also became easier to run 
contemporary operating systems on older machines. The average upgrade cycle slowed from about four 
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years to five or six years in 2016 (Shah, 2016). Holding onto their desktops and laptops and acquiring new 
forms of computers, households owned an increasing number of Internet-connected devices (TakCarta, 
2016). The average household in the UK, for example, owned seven such devices (Associated Press, 
2015). 
The average selling prices across all PC makers tended to decrease slowly over time (Arthur, 2014). The 
average profit per PC of the largest PC vendors hovered around a mere US$15, with the average profit 
margin often between two and three percent (Arthur, 2014). These cutthroat conditions exerted much 
pressure on all vendors, especially those without economies of scale. 
With high price pressures and weak demand, the market continued to consolidate. The combined market 
share of the three largest manufacturers—Lenovo, Hewlett-Packard (HP), and Dell—had grown from 41 
percent in 2011 to 57 percent in 2016. While Apple, Acer, and Asus saw little change in their traditional 
PC market share, the smaller manufacturers saw their combined share halved from 42 percent in 2011 to 
21 percent in 2016 (see Figure 3) (Gartner, 2016a)5. 
Realizing higher volumes in traditional PCs was not going to get any easier in the future. IDC, a research 
firm, forecasted a one percent compounded annual decline in its predictions up to 2020 (IDC, 2016a). It 
predicted that desktops sales would decline by 5.9 percent annually in mature markets and by 0.7 percent 
in emerging markets and that laptop sales would decline in mature markets by one percent and grow in 
emerging markets by two percent. See Appendix A for more details on this forecast. 
For Lenovo, product innovation seemed to be more of a necessity than a driver of growth. At annual 
consumer shows worldwide, vendors highlighted products with better specifications than the year before. 
They also exhibited curved displays, larger touchscreens, bendable devices, augmented and virtual 
reality, virtual keyboards, and so on. The rate of innovation in the industry set market expectations and 
made it hard for vendors to stand out. Yang pointed out (WARC, 2012): 
Selling PCs is like selling fresh fruit. The speed of innovation is very fast, so you must know how 
to keep up with the pace, control inventory, to match supply with demand and handle very fast 
turnover. 
 
Figure 3. Vendors’ Shares of Worldwide Sales of PC Units (Excl. Tablets) in the Fourth Quarters of 2011 to 
2016 (“Market Share”, 2017)6 
Vendors tried improving their profitability by offering extras. Accessories, software, maintenance services, 
warranties, and cloud services often enjoyed a much higher profit margin. Cloud services were an 
                                                     
5 Data includes desk-based PCs, notebook PCs, and ultra-mobile premiums (such as Microsoft Surface) but not Chromebooks or 
iPads. 
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increasingly popular way to serve consumers and enterprise customers with continued and integrated 
computing services (Arthur, 2014). 
3.1 Competitors 
HP, Lenovo’s chief competitor in traditional PCs, had experienced similar growth in the market. A much 
older organization, HP was a global leader in PCs, printing, and imaging, but most of its revenue came 
from PCs. In late 2015, HP spun off its large Enterprise division, which employed 250,000 employees 
(The Economist, 2015). Meanwhile, it increasingly outsourced the assembly of its products to contract 
manufacturers worldwide (Chao, 2012). While HP’s average PC sale price was declining, it seemed to 
benefit from sales of higher-end laptops and convertibles, which helped it improve its operating margin to 
about 4.2 percent in 2016. See Appendix E for financial information about Lenovo’s main competitors. 
Dell—a computer hardware company that began in 1984 and became private in 2013—was the world’s 
third largest vendor of traditional PCs in 2016. Its approach to PC sales emphasized customizability: it 
manufactured or configured PCs for users according to their specification. Dell’s product range included 
tablets, convertibles, laptops, desktops, monitors, gaming devices, servers, networking equipment, and 
printers. Like Lenovo, it had seen opportunity for growth outside the core of traditional PCs and invested 
much in storage. Three years after Lenovo partnered with EMC to split off and run a part of EMC, Dell 
bought EMC in 2015 for US$67 billion, which made it the largest-ever acquisition in the technology sector 
at the time. 
Apple, Acer, and Asus had PC sales that ranked just below those of Lenovo, HP, and Dell. Apple, one of 
the world’s most valuable brands, had always offered desktops that integrated its applications, its 
operating systems, computing hardware, and a display in a single device. More broadly, it had been at the 
frontier of serving customers through the seamless integration of hardware, software, and cloud services 
in and across its devices. It sold smartphones, tablets, laptops, desktops, and TV set-top boxes. As a PC 
vendor, Apple stood out from the rest with a higher average sales price (Arthur, 2014). 
Acer aimed to offer extras through the cloud and the Internet of things. In 2015 and 2016, it acquired a 
GPS cycling computer company, a robotics startup, a virtual reality hardware company, and a maker of 
pet cameras. Asus had a similar orientation to Acer: it offered a broad range of computing products, 
including smartphones, and sought to expand this range. It also focused on various aspects of innovation, 
such as portability, power efficiency, and sustainability (ASUS, 2015). 
4 Smartphones 
In 2016, Lenovo was responsible for about 4.6 percent of global sales. Its smartphone sales had 
fluctuated, and in 2016, both its smartphone sales and its smartphone market share were declining, which 
Lenovo wanted to change. 
The smartphone market was vibrant and its growth trajectory steep (see Figure 4). The sales of 
smartphones to end users doubled every two years from 172 million units in 2009 to 1,423 million units in 
2015 (Statista, 2016c). Smartphone sales surpassed PCs sales in late 2010 and outsold them four to one 
in 2015 (Albenesius, 2011). This growth caught the attention of many technology companies and fueled 
much investment. Patent wars broke out, and companies forged billion-dollar partnerships. 
As mobile phones originally came with little functionality beyond mobile voice and text telecommunication, 
the makers of the devices developed strong ties and sometimes even exclusive partnerships with telecom 
service providers, which shaped the game at the dawn of the smartphone. Many vendors sold their 
smartphones to end consumers via operators, also called carriers, which tied them to service 
subscriptions. A common sales model was a two-year contract with payments due each month, which 
lowered the barrier to upgrade the phone and renew the contract after. Financially, this model allowed 
more consumers to adopt and to continue to adopt the newest high-end phones. It also meant that makers 
of smartphones, compared to PC makers, had less control over the consumer-oriented activities in 
distribution, marketing, sales, and customer relationships. 
462 Lenovo: Being on Top in a Declining Industry 
 
Volume 42  10.17705/1CAIS.04217 Paper 17  
 
 
Figure 4. Worldwide Shipments of Smartphones in Units and Year-on-year Growth (Statista, 2016c) 
After years of double-digit growth, in 2016, the smartphone market began to cool: worldwide, smartphone 
shipments increased by two percent, but they declined in some geographic markets. Countries varied in 
their telecom infrastructure, local service providers, and competitors. Adoption rates varied widely, too, 
and correlated strongly with GDP, which Figure 5 shows (Poushter, 2016). Yang said (Lenovo, 2016b, p. 
30): 
The rules of game are so different across different regions. So we split the Mobile Business 
Group (MBG) into China and “Rest Of World” (ROW). MBG ROW is ready for profitable growth, 
while China is at a critical point of rebuilding its competitiveness. 
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4.1 China 
In 2009, Lenovo decided to launch its smartphone business with increased investment in China. It bought 
back its mobile phone division for US$200 million, and, by 2011, it had developed its own manufacturing 
facility in the Chinese province of Wuhan with the capacity to make 40 million smartphones annually. The 
company aimed to serve Chinese consumers across economic segments by offering products in a wide 
range of prices and by partnering with operators to offer subsidies and make phones more affordable. 
Initially, its plan bore fruit; by the end of 2012, it had captured 14 percent of the market, second only to 
Samsung. In the following years, however, operators in China slashed the smartphone subsidies that 
Lenovo relied on (Bloomberg, 2014). New entrants such as Xiaomi, Oppo, and Vivo introduced low-cost 
smartphones, while Huawei introduced high-end phones. Chinese consumers began to feel more 
comfortable buying smartphones online and without operators as intermediaries. Lenovo was poorly 
prepared for these trends. Having invested much in the channel that combined operators and retail stores, 
it lost most of its share in China to Apple and new Chinese competitors. Yang said (Lenovo, 2016b, p. 21): 
The competition in [the] China smartphone market remained very keen while demand turned softer 
due to the economy. The Group has taken actions to strengthen its open channel partnership and 
brand strategy and to shift its product portfolio towards higher average selling price in order to turn 
around its China business over time. 
In 2015, Lenovo launched a subsidiary, Zuk, and set up a separate smartphone business group 
specifically for China. With this reorganization, it aimed to address the economic segments through 
multiple brands: Moto, Lenovo, and Zuk. Moto was a brand of Motorola and associated with high-end 
phones. The Zuk brand was more affordable with prices under US$250. This multibrand approach had not 
led to growth in fiscal 2016 because Lenovo faced tough competitors across all price levels. See Appendix 
F for the Chinese market shares of the largest smartphone competitors. 
Oppo and Vivo, both owned by BBK Electronics Corporation, a Chinese consumer electronics company, 
had quickly gained market share in China to achieve ranks one and three in 2016 with 17 and 15 percent, 
respectively (IDC, 2016b). They quickly developed smartphones, adopted the latest technology and 
aggressive ad campaigns, and sold them at low prices. They wanted to grow internationally using their 
facilities in India and Southeast Asia.  
Huawei, the world’s largest telecom equipment manufacturer, had established itself as one of the leading 
smartphone makers in China for many years. In 2015 and 2016, it sold about 18 million smartphones 
every quarter, which made it number one in 2015 and number two in 2016. While it had relied heavily on 
relatively cheap handsets in the past, it increasingly focused on mid- to high-priced smartphones, which 
accounted for about 60 percent of its sales in the third quarter of 2016. One Huawei brand, Honor, 
targeted inexpensive, online-only sales, whereas the Huawei brand itself focused on higher-priced 
phones. 
Newcomer Xiaomi stunned its smartphone competitors. In just four years, it gained a 15 percent share in 
a quickly growing market. Its business model stood out: offering smartphones directly to consumers 
without operators or retail shops at a very low price point. However, the surge in e-commerce did not last 
as long as Xiaomi had hoped, and the company found it had to push its phones into retail stores in 2016. 
Mediocre product reviews also hurt. In 2016, Xiaomi’s market share halved, and its shipments dropped by 
40 percent (IDC, 2016b). 
Apple was also losing ground but not as quickly. It was the only foreign smartphone maker that had 
survived in the top five. Initially, it had benefited from high margins and its perception as an excellent 
brand with outstanding products. However, the rise of new Chinese brands and a lack of major 
innovations to its iPhone had some Chinese consumers questioning its value for the money. Per phone 
sold, Apple stood out from the rest with much higher prices. 
This intense competition was not Lenovo’s only concern. More than half of all Chinese already owned a 
smartphone, a number that rose by the day. In the higher-end segment, this fact made China a mature 
market driven more by replacement than initial adoption.  
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4.2 Outside of China 
Lenovo’s difficulties in China led the company to shift its ambitions to markets elsewhere. While it had not 
established leadership in any geographical location, it had grown in emerging markets. It focused on 
continuing its growth in these markets while breaking through mature markets. 
In emerging markets, Lenovo’s sales had increased thanks to rising demand from first-time buyers. 
Growth was particularly rapid in India, Indonesia, Russia, and across the Middle East, which allowed 
Lenovo to report record-high shipment growth in three geographies in 2016. In the Asia-Pacific (excluding 
China), it realized 96 percent year-on-year growth; in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, it realized 83 
percent growth; and, in Latin America, it realized 46 percent growth (Lenovo, 2016b). In countries with low 
adoption but relatively high GDP growth prospects, it forecasted strong continued growth in smartphone 
demand. In combination with a large population, these characteristics made India in particular an 
appealing market for Lenovo and its competitors. 
However, mature markets caused the company some concern. Lenovo’s product transition in North 
America was taking longer than expected, which resulted in a 13 percent decline in the company’s global 
shipments in fiscal 2016. Consumers and businesses were not choosing Lenovo to replace their 
smartphones but rather Samsung, Apple, or Huawei.  
Samsung had been the market leader since the downfall of BlackBerry and Nokia. As the world’s largest 
consumer electronics company, Samsung used its size to its advantage. It used its technical and financial 
capabilities to quickly try out many models to see what the market liked (Grobart, 2013). Its organization 
was militaristic with clockwork planning and a culture of falling in line. Its profit margin in smartphones was 
lower than that of Apple but higher than that of many newcomers. Samsung increasingly saw new 
Chinese manufacturers as a threat given that they caused the company’s global smartphone share to 
drop from 30 percent in 2012 to about 20 percent in 2016. 
Apple was number two in terms of smartphone shipments and number one in profit. Having a holistic 
vision of user experience, it integrated its hardware with a proprietary operating system to focus its 
attention on just a few smartphone models. This platform strategy allowed Apple to create a more 
transformative user experience that led to enhanced brand loyalty and higher margins, which, at times, 
exceeded 100 percent of the total market’s profits (Reisinger, 2016)7. 
Huawei, with its telecom equipment already present in many organizations and households around the 
world, started to aggressively establish itself in the smartphone market. It increased its global market 
share from 3.3 percent in 2012 to 10.6 percent in 2016 and, thus, positioned itself as a major contender to 
Samsung and Apple. Its success in telecom provided ample resources for research and development. It 
also leveraged intangible assets, such as relationships with operators in Europe, Africa, and Latin 
America, to strike deals and cross-sell smartphones with switches and other network equipment.  
4.3 Smartphone Innovation by Lenovo 
Since 2014, Lenovo made some bold moves by buying Google’s Motorola Mobility and liaising with 
Google to equip smartphones with augmented reality. Yet, it faced a daunting task in taking on Samsung, 
Apple, and Huawei. 
Motorola had had an 85-year history in the US and possessed two valuable brands that Americans knew 
well: Motorola itself and Moto. Its relationships with US operators allowed it to continue an ongoing deal 
with Verizon and to place the Moto X phone on three of the four national operators. Lenovo saw a good 
match of these assets with its growth ambitions and bought Motorola Mobility from Google for nearly 
US$3 billion. It hailed the acquisition as a step up to the third position on the global stage. 
However, it only marginally and momentarily realized this promise. In the first quarter of 2015, Lenovo 
reached the third position with 5.6 percent—just above Huawei with 5.2 percent and well under Samsung 
with 24.6 percent and Apple, with 18.3 percent (Statista, 2016a). By the second quarter that year, Huawei 
had overtaken Lenovo. 
Lenovo changed its plans for Motorola shortly after its acquisition. It had intended merely to nurture 
Motorola as an independent subsidiary but then decided to eliminate the Motorola brand and many 
inherited jobs (Whitwam, 2016). It revamped its high-end product line with Moto Z phones that featured a 
                                                     
7 Since the total market’s profits include losses of competitors (i.e. negative profit), Apple’s share could exceed 100 percent. 
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modular design. Users could clip separate modules, called Moto Mods, onto the back of the phone to 
equip it with a better camera, better speakers, a second battery or a projector. 
While imaginative, this modular approach proved tricky. Product reviews complained about the high price 
tags of the modules (Savov, 2016b). Google also abandoned a project to make a modular smartphone 
(Statt, 2016). Rafa Camargo, Lead Engineer of this Google project said (Hollister, 2016): 
When we did our user studies, what we found was that most users don’t care about 
modularizing the core functions. They expect them all to be there, to always work, and to be 
consistent. 
Lenovo launched the Moto brand, including its Moto Z, in most of its markets worldwide. In India and 
Brazil, it did well, but, by 2016, Motorola had not yielded the overall results Lenovo had hoped for (Savov, 
2016a). Yang suggested that internal issues constituted one reason for these lackluster results: 
“Integration efforts did not meet expectations”. Further, he said that Lenovo continued its endeavor to 
align Motorola Mobility with Lenovo “to leverage the[ir] complementary strengths, streamline the product 
portfolio, improve efficiency and enhance the cost structure” (Lenovo, 2016b, p. 19). 
Another key innovation was Lenovo’s Phab smartphones. They were the first consumer smartphones that 
enabled applications to provide augmented reality using Google’s Tango platform. Phab users could 
measure the physical space around them and augment this space with, for example, virtual desks, dogs 
or dominos. Users could put any digital object in a 3D model of their environment and see the object in the 
live camera view as if it were physical. While the Phab smartphones were relatively large and thick and 
their augmented reality performance was irregular at times, many reviewers saw them as first steps in 
providing a new way to play, learn, and discover (Velazco, 2016). Competitors of Lenovo followed suit, 
and Asus announced it would launch a Tango phone in 2017 (ASUS, 2016). 
5 Cross-product Synergies 
While the smartphone market clearly differed from the PC market, coordinating the two businesses could 
help organizations such as Lenovo achieve synergies. 
Like PCs, smartphones comprised a central processing unit, a graphical processing unit, memory 
components, a motherboard, an electric power unit, a screen, speakers, and various components to allow 
for wired and wireless connections with other devices. While some devices differed in size, most types of 
components relied on the same or similar materials and manufacturing processes. Producing PCs and 
smartphones together, as Lenovo did in its facility in Wuhan in China, offered several advantages. The 
innovation of PCs and smartphones could rely on the same R&D resources. Deals with vendors of raw 
materials, components, and machines could become more attractive, while the flexible planning of 
production capacities could enable more manufacturing efficiency and, thus, lower costs and time to 
market. 
Huawei had achieved cross-product synergy by bundling smartphones and network equipment to telecom 
operators. Lenovo might benefit in similar ways. Some of its PC distribution channels, such as retail stores 
in consumer electronics, were clearly suitable for the smartphone business, too. As smartphone 
purchases were increasingly detached from operator subscriptions in some countries, cross-sales would 
become attractive, which would apply to not only retail stores but also online resellers. Cross-selling PCs 
and smartphones to corporate customers could also become more lucrative (Gartner, 2016c). 
Another area of potential synergy was in offering benefits to the users of multiple devices. Apple had 
made the most progress in developing an ecosystem that improved cross-product usability. It allowed 
users to transfer or stream media and other files across devices and to and from the cloud. It did not offer 
separate products but rather a range of compatible products and services. Even though Lenovo did not 
have such ecosystem, Yang saw possibilities (Lenovo, 2016b, p. 11): 
Delivering on this promise—innovative devices + cloud connectivity—is where Lenovo will 
attack and grow. This is where we have proven capabilities, core competencies and competitive 
advantages. 
Potentially, by offering cloud services and connecting these services with devices, Lenovo could make all 
these devices more attractive. But, as Lenovo had long been growing as a device-oriented company with 
dedicated business groups targeting specific products, achieving a seamless integration with its cloud 
services across its devices could prove a formidable task. 
466 Lenovo: Being on Top in a Declining Industry 
 
Volume 42  10.17705/1CAIS.04217 Paper 17  
 
6 Looking Forward 
Lenovo seemed financially able to continue to invest in its smartphone operations. While the PC market 
was shrinking, Lenovo had been able to increase its share in it. As consolidation showed no signs of 
ending, Lenovo could likely continue to profit from PCs in the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, the 
company had to grapple with strong competitors that had ample resources, integrated product portfolios, 
and established relations with telecom operators. At the same time, it had to compete with smaller players 
that were adept at penetrating the lower-end markets.  
In the rapidly changing smartphone market, Lenovo felt it was between a rock and a hard place. Yang 
wondered how Lenovo could deploy its vast resources most effectively. 
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Appendix A: Worldwide Shipments of Personal Computers 
 
Figure A1. Number of Personal Computers Recently Shipped Worldwide (Adapted from Gartner, 2011; 
Gartner, 2012; Gartner, 2013; Gartner, 2014; Gartner, 2015; Gartner, 2016b; Gartner, 2017) 
 














Mature 39.1 15.10% 30.6 12.30% -5.90% 
Emerging 64.4 25.00% 62.5 25.00% -0.70% 
Both 103.5 40.10% 93.1 37.20% -2.60% 
Notebook 
Mature 87 33.70% 83.5 33.40% -1.00% 
Emerging 67.7 26.20% 73.4 29.40% 2.00% 
Both 154.7 59.90% 156.9 62.80% 0.40% 
Total PC 
Mature 126.1 48.80% 114.1 45.70% -2.50% 
Emerging 132.1 51.20% 135.9 54.30% 0.70% 
Both 258.2 100.00% 250 100.00% -0.80% 
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Appendix B: Recent Income Statements and Balance Sheets of Lenovo 
Table B1. Income Statement of Lenovo in Millions of USD Except for Per Share Items (Google Finance, 
2016d) 
 Fiscal year* 
2016 2015 2014 2013 
Turnover 44,912 46,296 38,707 33,873 
Operating profit -267 953 983 802 
Non-operating/exceptional items 2 1 22 -0 
Associates -11 17 9 -1 
Profit before taxation -277 971 1,014 801 
Taxation -132 134 197 170 
Minority interests -16 8 0 -4 
Preference share dividend 0 0 0 0 
Net profit -128 829 817 635 
Total dividend 379 380 322 248 
Retained profit/(loss) -507 449 495 387 
Gross profit 6,624 6,682 5,064 4,427 
Depreciation 266 208 110 92 
Interest paid 179 117 47 21 
Interest capitalized 0 0 0 0 
Turnover growth (%) -3 20 14 15 
Net profit growth (%) - 1 29 34 
Taxation rate (%) - 14 19 21 
EPS (HKD) -0 1 1 0 
Diluted EPS (HKD) -0 1 1 0 
* The fiscal years of Lenovo and other companies listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange end on March 31. 
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Table B2. Summarized Balance Sheet of Lenovo in Millions of USD (Google Finance, 2016d)  
 As at 
31 March 2016  
As at 
31 March 2015 
As at 
31 March 2014  
Cash and equivalents 153 744 720 
Short-term Investments 89 101 94 
Cash and short-term investments 2,015 2,956 3,952 
Total receivables (net) 7,486 8,092 5,622 
Total Inventory 2,637 2,954 2,701 
Total current assets 12,967 15,507 13,401 
Property/plant/equipment (total—gross) 2,622 2,529 1,659 
Accumulated depreciation (total) -1,000 -774 -640 
Goodwill (net) 4,899 5,220 2,390 
Intangibles (net) 3,762 4,006 950 
Long-term investments 180 119 56 
Other long-term assets (total) 1,503 790 542 
Total assets 24,933 27,397 18,357 
Accounts payable 4,501 4,835 4,860 
Accrued expenses 2,049 2,265 1,359 
Total current liabilities 15,760 17,448 13,462 
Long term debt 2,505 1,886 10 
Total debt 3,251 3,054 456 
Total Liabilities 21,933 23,313 15,347 
Total equity 3,000 4,084 3,010 
Total liabilities and shareholders' equity 24,933 27,397 18,357 
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Appendix C: Geographical Analysis of Lenovo’s Turnover 
 
Figure C1. Geographical Analysis of Lenovo’s Turnover 2014-2016 (Adapted from Lenovo, 2014; Lenovo, 
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Appendix D: Top Management Team of Lenovo  
Table D1. Top Management Team of Lenovo (Adapted from Lenovo, 2017; selected LinkedIn profiles; 
Google Finance, 2016d) 
Name* Gender Age** Current position Since 
Yuanqing Yang Male 52 Chairman and Chief Executive Officer 2011 
Gianfranco Lanci Male 62 Corporate President and Chief Operating Officer 2015 




Executive Vice President and Co-President of the Mobile 
Business Group, and Chairman and President of Motorola 
2016 
Liu Jun Male 
 
Executive Vice President and President, Lenovo China 2017 
Skaugen Kirk Male 46 
Executive Vice President and President of the Data 
Center Group 
2016 
Rui Yong Male 47 Senior Vice President, Chief Technology Officer 2016 
Lan Gao Female 51 Senior Vice President of Human Resources 
 
Zhiqiang He Male 54 
Senior Vice President of Lenovo Capital and Incubator 
Group 
2016 
Arthur Hu Male 
 
Senior Vice President and Chief Information Officer 2016 
Jian Qiao Female 49 
Senior Vice President and Co-President of the Mobile 
Business Group China 
2016 
Laura Quatela Female 
 
Senior Vice President and Chief Legal Officer 2016 
David Roman Male 
 
Senior Vice President and Chief Marketing Officer 2010 
Luca Rossi Male 
 
Senior Vice President and President, Latin America (LA) 
and Europe, Middle East and Africa (EMEA) 
2015 
* Name order: given name followed by surname. 
** Age current as at 2017. 
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Appendix E: Financial Comparison between Lenovo and Its PC 
Competitors 
Table E1. Summarized Income Statement of Lenovo and Its PC Competitors in Millions of USD (Adapted 










12 months ending 
31 March 2016  
12 months ending 
 31 March 2016 
52 weeks ending  
29 January 2016  
52 weeks ending 
24 September 2016  
Total revenue 44,912 48,238 50,911 215,639 
Cost of revenue (total) 38,288 39,240 42,524 131,376 
Gross profit 6,624 8,998 8,387 84,263 
Selling/general/adm. 
expenses (total) 
4,482 3,840 7,851 14,194 
Research and development 1,491 -1,209 1,031 10,045 
Total operating expense 44,974 44,689 51,425 155,615 
Operating income -62 3,549 -514 60,024 
Income before tax -277 3,761 -1,286 61,372 
Income after tax -145 2,666 -1,168 45,687 
The table reflects OTC Markets Group’s record of Lenovo’s income statement following an American standard. 
 
Table E2. Summarized Balance Sheet of Lenovo and Its PC Competitors in Millions of USD (Adapted 











As of  
2016-03-31 
As of  
2016-04-30 
As of  
2016-04-29 
As of  
2016-03-26 
Cash and short-term 
investments 
2,015.41 4,636.00 8,994.00 55,283.00 
Total receivables (net) 7,485.72 6,121.00 5,075.00 19,824.00 
Total inventory 2,637.32 3,547.00 1,655.00 2,281.00 
Total current assets 12,966.78 15,385.00 20,764.00 87,592.00 
Property/plant/equipment 
(total—gross) 
2,622.18 5,932.00 - 54,051.00 
Accumulated depreciation (total) -999.57 -4,360.00 - -30,848.00 
Goodwill (net) 4,898.64 5,672.00 9,797.00 5,249.00 
Intangibles (net) 3,762.45 - 8,663.00 3,843.00 
Long-term investments 180.01 - 2,291.00 177,645.00 
Other long-term assets (total) 1,502.91 1,940.00 680 7,745.00 
Total assets 24,933.39 25,523.00 43,879.00 305,277.00 
Accounts payable 4,501.35 9,099.00 12,412.00 25,098.00 
Accrued expenses 2,048.55 6,359.00 4,193.00 21,896.00 
Total current liabilities 15,760.26 16,862.00 23,948.00 68,265.00 
Long-term debt 2,505.11 6,708.00 10,679.00 69,374.00 
Total debt 3,250.93 6,772.00 13,144.00 79,872.00 
Total liabilities 21,933.19 30,309.00 42,272.00 174,820.00 
Total equity 3,000.20 -4,786.00 1,607.00 130,457.00 
Total liabilities and shareholders' 
equity 
24,933.39 25,523.00 43,879.00 305,277.00 
The table reflects OTC Markets Group’s record of Lenovo’s income statement following an American standard. 
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Appendix F: Shares of the Biggest Smartphone Sellers in China 
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Appendix G: The Product Lifecycle 
The product lifecycle describes four market stages of successful products: introduction, growth, maturity, 
and decline (see Figure G1). Product sales on the Y-axis represent the combined sales of the product or a 
category of similar products by all vendors in a market. The plot represents a typical, overall pattern of 
sales over the life of a product. The X-axis denotes the different stages over time, and the duration of 
each stage depends on a host of factors, such as product and market characteristics. Each stage 
corresponds to different characteristics, which has implications for many organizational functions. 
 
Figure G1. Product Lifecycle 
In the introduction stage, organizations begin selling the products and invest considerably in product 
development, production, marketing, and distribution. As a result, products introduced in this stage 
typically sell at higher prices compared to other stages. Customers who buy technology products in this 
stage—often termed innovators or early adopters—tend to be more prosperous (Rogers, 2010). They 
often buy the products due to a desire for novelty, which leads to distinct consumption patterns compared 
to those who buy products in the later stages. 
The growth stage features strong growth in product sales, which allows organizations to achieve 
economies of scale and reduce unit costs. With ensuing profits, producers and sellers may recuperate 
some of the investment they made earlier. In markets with low entry barriers, the growth stage tends to 
attract new entrants to the market, which increases competitiveness and lowers prices. Customers who 
buy technology products in this stage are often termed the early majority and follow somewhat more 
conservative adoption patterns compared to innovators and early adopters (Rogers, 2010). 
The maturity stage features high sales that signal a decreasing growth rate. Established producers have 
typically lowered costs through their investments in the previous stages, which makes this stage their 
most profitable one. Competition often continues to lower prices, however. Outsiders are less attracted to 
enter the market and compete, and small players become increasingly wary of investment to boost their 
market shares. As a result, markets start to consolidate. Customers who buy products in this stage—
termed the late majority—often follow a more conservative and price-conscious consumption pattern 
(Rogers, 2010). 
The decline stage, the last stage of the product lifecycle, signals a continued but eventual slow decline of 
product sales and a consolidated and saturated market. Product penetration approximates a ceiling, which 
makes it ever harder to sell products to new customers. Those customers who adopt the product in this 
stage are called laggards and form the oldest and most conservative profile (Rogers, 2010). In some 
technology markets, replacement drives sales in this stage. In competitive markets, prices and profit 
margins tend to be low and include only those producers that have established economies of scale or a 
competitive advantage. 
Hence, differences across the stages do not only indicate differences in sales but relate to a host of 
variables, including the likelihood of organizations entering and exiting a market, the price level, the type 
of customers, cash flow, and the operations required to fulfill demand. As such, the product lifecycle can 
serve as an important planning tool in management, finance, marketing, operations, and other 
organizational functions. 
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Appendix H: The Growth Share Matrix 
The growth share matrix is a framework that Bruce Henderson, founder of the Boston Consulting Group, 
conceived in 1970 to help evaluate businesses. It categorizes companies’ product-specific businesses8 
according to the relative growth of the market and the size of the company’s market share. The matrix 
results from dichotomizing these dimensions (see Figure H1). 
 
Figure H1. The Growth Share Matrix 
Each cell in the matrix describes a category of business: 
• Dogs are businesses with a low market growth rate and a small market share. Compared to 
other types, dogs are the least profitable and often have ongoing costs that exceed revenues. 
In established markets, dogs tend to have bleak prospects and are typically candidates for 
divestment. 
• Cash cows are businesses with a low market growth rate and a large market share. They are 
more valuable than dogs because of their higher level of continued revenues. In established 
markets, companies tend to invest in cash cows only when defending a leading market 
position. 
• Question marks are businesses with a high market growth rate and a small market share. 
Many new businesses start as question marks, and companies seek to convert them into stars 
as the market expands. Without this achievement, they risk ending up as dogs after the market 
matures. Thus, investing in question marks requires much attention. 
• Stars are businesses with a high market growth rate and a large market share. Stars generate 
the most revenue and are the strongest factors of a company’s growth. Companies tend to 
defend any stars they have while planning for a slowdown. Upon maturation and decline of the 
market growth, they may convert stars into cash cows. 
By typifying businesses, the growth share matrix can help inform investment decisions with regard to a 
product portfolio. Henderson (1970) writes:  
                                                     
8 “Business” here refers to the commercial activity in a company regarding a type of product or service. Thus, a company can have 
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The balanced portfolio has Stars whose high share and high growth assure the future, Cash 
Cows that supply funds for that future growth, and Question Marks to be converted into Stars 
with the added funds. 
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